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NATURE OF THE CASE 
The earlier statement of the case by Appellant 
in its original brief will be sufficient for purposes of 
this Reply Brief. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Reference is made again to the statement of the 
lower court disposition made in its original brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal or remand of this 
case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant relies, for purposes of this reply brief, 
upon its statement of the facts in the original appellate 
brief filed with the court. 
ARGUMENT 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CAUSE OF 
ACTIOil FOR INTERFERENCE \JITH PROSPECTIVE 
ECONOMIC OR BUSINESS RELATIONS OR ADVANTAGES 
INDEPENDENT OF SIMPLE BREACH OF CONTRACT BY APPELLAlJT. 
Globe's brief to the court specified precisely, 
perhaps for the first time, the nature of the claim being 
~ade against the Bank. Globe claims that the termination of 
a contract to loan money and the actions of the Bank in 
affecting direct collection of lease payments assigned to it 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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were, along with the dishonor of certain checks, the cause 
of 1) the loss of Globe's existing source of financing, 2) 
the inability to obtain financing from other sources, and 3) 
consequently, the inability to continue its leasing business 
and the loss of the expectancy of future profitable lease 
contracts. 
The Bank's termination of further financing 
and its notification of lease assignment to the automo-
bile lessees of Globe, if wrongful at all, were simply 
contract breaches. The undisputeCT evidence before the court 
below establishes an express contract providing that the 
Bank would loan funds to Globe subject to certain conditions 
and under specific termination rights. There was no evidence 
of any other contractual or quasi-contractual right or 
expectanc:;; in Globe for the receipt of loan funds from Bank. 
Under the circumstances in evidence, the allegations of 
Globe setting forth the Bank's refusal to continue lending 
to Globe amount to nothing more than a claim for breach of 
the contract to loan funds. 
As the record shows and, as a matter of 
law, there was no breach of the contract to loan funds. 
However, assuming that such a breach occurred, the lau is 
that the remedy is for breach of contract and not for tortious 
-2-
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interference. In Glazer v. Chandler, 414 Pa. 304, 200 A.2d 
416, 418 (1964) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated: 
However, where, as in this case, the 
allegations and evidence only disclose 
that defendant breached his contracts with 
plaintiff and that as an incidental conse-
quence thereof plaintiff's business relation-
ships with third parties have been affected, 
an action lies only in contract for defend-
ant's breaches, and the consequential dam-
ages recoverable, if any, may be adjudicated 
onlv in that action. 
To permit a promisee to sue his promis-
sor in tort for breaches of contract inter se 
would erode the usual rules of contractual 
recovery and inject confusion into our well-
settled forms of actions. '.1ost courts 
have been cautious about permitting tort 
recovery for contractual breaches and we 
are in full accord with this policy. See 
Developments in the Law--Competitive Torts, 
77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 968 (1964). The methods 
of proof and the damages recoverable in ac-
t ions for breach of contract are well estab-
lished and need not be embellished b new 
proce ures or new concepts which might tend 
to confuse both the bar and litigants. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington 
has further analyzed Glazer and the principles involved 
in Cherberg v. Peoples National Bank of Washington, 88 
\fash.2d 595, P.2d 1137, 1143 (1977). The Washington Supreme 
Court there held, in substance, that whether an independent 
remedy for tortious interference with business expectancies 
can be founded upon actions which constitute a breach of a 
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contract with the plaintiff by the defendant, depends upon 
whether the "interference with business relations was a mere 
incidental consequence of the breach or a motive or purpose 
therefor." Id. at 1143. That court goes on to say that 
such independent tort liability may be properly imposed 
where the motive for the breach is "not a privileged mo-
tive." Id. at 1144. The Glazer and Cherberg decisions 
together stand for the proposition that in order for tor-
tious interference to be a separate and independent cause of 
action in circumstances also constituting breach of con-
tract, the interference resulting must be the purpose or 
objective o:= the defendant and the defendant must be shown 
to stand to [!,ain some unfair advantage or benefit from such 
interference or that the defendant desires to interfere for 
the sake of interference, i.e. maliciously. l/ 
In this case, there was no evidence of malice or 
other improper motive for the alleged breach outside the 
confines of the "parties' obligations under their existint: 
as,reement." Id. at 1144. Accordinz,ly, at the very least 
tr~1e case sho,_,ld be reversed and remanded to apply damage 
rules applicable to a contract breach, if any such breach 
ll See also, Developments in the Law--Competitive Torts, 
77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 968 (1964). The authors indicate 
that there should be a damage differentiation between in-
terferences arising from "predatory" practices as opposed t'' 
those arising froPl "negligence." 
-4-
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occurred. 
The argument is parallel with respect to the 
notification of assignment made by the bank to the auto-
mobile lessees. As both Globe and the Bank have argued, the 
issue surrounding those assignments and the Bank's actions 
in relation thereto is whether or not the contracts as-
signing the leases afforded collection rights of the kind 
asserted or whether such actions were a breach of contract. 
Globe argues that a condition to the notification and col-
lection right under those assignment contracts was not met. 
Thus the cause of action is for breach of contract. The 
record contains no evidence that the Bank could gain by any 
interference with Globe's relations with other lending 
institutions or with its potential customers. The Bank's 
actions were not malicious. The evidence is that such 
interference, if any, resulting from the Bank's actions was 
purely "incidental" to the alleged breach and not the motive 
or purpose of the breach. 
The finding of tortious interference at least on 
the basis of the credit termination and the assigned lease 
collection efforts of the Bank is erroneous under the law. 
The Bank is entitled to a reversal or remand for a 
determination by the trial court of whether or not it 
-5-
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breached the loan and lease assignment contracts and, if so, 
what the appropriate measure of damages should be under 
contract law as opposed to tort law. 
(I 1 · -
DATED this ~day of June, 1978. 
~spectfulll su\mitted, 
\i\_ ~\hi h-L 
ROBERT H. ANDERSON 
DOUGLAS MATSUMORI 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarth.• 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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